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BUCKLEY V. VALEO: A LANDMARK OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
by
Joel M. Gora*
It is appropriate for an article about the Supreme Court's Buckley opinion
to appear in a law review in the Buckeye State. In terms of poll rankings, the
Buckeye football team finished last season ranked number two in the polls,' which
was much better than the Buckley decision, which many academics have put on
their list of the ten worst decisions of this century.' While the football pollsters
were right in ranking the Buckeyes so highly, the academic pundits are dead wrong
in rating the Buckley decision so poorly. The Buckley decision, far from being a
derelict ruling or a jurisprudential outcast, is a landmark of political freedom, a
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Staff Counsel and Associate Legal Director,
American Civil Liberties Union, 1969-1978. Co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). I would like to express my appreciation for a Brooklyn Law
School Summer Research Stipend grant for my work on this article.
'Joe Drape, Mission Accomplished, If Sloppily, by the B.C.S., N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at
D6.
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Exchange; Speech in the Welfare State: Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 255, 291 (1992); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L.
REV. 1405 (1986). At best, Buckley gets compared with and criticized like the "discredited"
Lochner doctrine which gave broad judicial protection to economic rights against police
power regulation. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Worse still, some compare
Buckley to the Court's disastrous decision upholding the "separate but equal" doctrine in race
relations. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Worst of all, some commentators have
even compared Buckley to the Court's tragic ruling in the infamous Dred Scott case (Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857) which essentially upheld slavery and all but
guaranteed the inevitability of the Civil War. Scott Turow, The High Court's 20-Year-Old
Mistake, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, Section 4, p. 15. The Buckley decision, however, is
not without its prominent academic defenders, many of whom feel that the Court's decision
was basically sound, so far as it went, but that the Court should have been more rigorous in
its scrutiny of the way in which limits on campaign funding limit political speech and
association. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments,
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 663 (1997); Bradley Smith, Faulty
Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE
L.J. 1049, 1056 (1996); It also has strong defenders among nationally well-know First
Amendment litigators. Floyd Abrams, Look Who's Trashing the FirstAmendment, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., November/December (1997).
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ruling which carefully and conscientiously addressed the critical issues of campaign
finance controls and free speech rights which still bedevil the nation today. Though
not without considerable flaws, the decision stands as a beacon illuminating the
view of First Amendment freedoms and political liberty that has informed Supreme
Court jurisprudence for the second half of this century. Compared to the limits-
driven repressive regime of government command and control of the political
process embodied in the Federal Election Campaign Act, the vision of the Buckley
opinion seeks to put as much control of the funding of the political process as
possible in the hands of the people, not the government.
A. The core of the First Amendment
Because of the efforts to demonize the Buckley ruling and the repeated
rhetoric about how our campaign finance system is corrupting the country and
undermining democracy, it is important to remember that campaign finance laws
operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment concern: they regulate
and restrain speech about government and politics. In a ruling just four years ago,
in a case arising in Ohio and involving regulation of campaign literature, the Court
reminded us of the dangers when government attempts to regulate and control
political speech, which, "as we have explained on many prior occasions ...
occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment .. . .
Quoting at length and with approval from Buckley, the Court explained why this
is so:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political
expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the
people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484(1957). Although First Amendment
protections are not confined to "the exposition of
ideas," Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948),
"there is practically universal agreement" that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect
3Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995).
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the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of
course including discussions of candidates .... "
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). This
no more than reflects our "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people
are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office is
essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we
follow as a nation. As the Court observed in
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971), "it can hardly be doubted that the
constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office., 4
That is why, the Court concluded, as it had in cases from Buckley on, that
laws regulating and burdening "core political speech" like a campaign
leaflet or the funding of political speech must be subject to the most
"exacting scrutiny. ' 5
41d. at 346-347 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (1976)).
5Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissent) and cases cited therein. In a way, the Court's
elegant constitutional language reflected its appreciation of an axiom of politics occasionally
expressed somewhat less elegantly: "Money is the Mother's Milk of Politics." Actually, my
own first encounter with campaign finance issues came in 1962 - well before my
involvement in the Buckley case - as a college summer intern with the Democratic State
Central Committee in my native Los Angeles, when I worked for the man who is widely-
credited with having coined that phrase. He was a well-known California politician named
Jesse Unruh, who at the time was the powerful Democratic Speaker of the California State
Assembly. William Safire, Clone, Clone, Clone, Clone, N. Y. TIMES, April 6, 1997, Sec.
6, p. 18. He was a prodigious fund-raiser and pioneered what we now call "Leadership
PACs." By centralizing fund-raising for Democratic members of the State legislature, he
was able to keep party cohesion which was instrumental in the passage of numerous
prominent, progressive pieces of legislation, many of which bore his name. He helped the
liberal Governor Edmond G. "Pat" Brown gain an upset victory over former Vice-President
Richard M. Nixon in the 1962 gubernatorial race. As Curtis Gans frequently points out,
much of the most important progressive legislation of the 20th century was passed during
a time when politicians raised funds in a largely unregulated manner such as that. 143 Cong.
1999]
AKRON LAW REVIEW
B. The initial victims of campaign finance reform
Even before Buckley, the civil liberties community and the courts began to
encounter the difficulty of reconciling campaign finance controls with First
Amendment rights. The first significant case arose when three old-time dissenters
came into the offices of the ACLU in the Spring of 1972, with what seemed an
incredible story. In late May of that year, they had sponsored a two-page ad in The
New York Times advocating the impeachment of President Richard Nixon for
bombing Cambodia and praising the handful of Members of Congress who had
voted against the bombing. The United States Justice Department hauled the group
into federal court, demanded to know how they were organized and who had paid
for the ad, threatened the group with injunctions for what they had done and told
them they could not engage in further political speech of that nature unless they
filed reports and disclosures with the government and otherwise complied with a
wide variety of rules and regulations.6 This was all for sponsoring an advertisement
publicly criticizing the President of the United States.
Such a consequence seemed particularly paradoxical because this was a
time when First Amendment case law had developed its most rigorous protection
of citizen criticism of government officials and policies.7 How, in the face of that
Rec. S. 10103, 10135 (1997).
My intern's job, however, was to organize the more grass-roots-oriented door-to-
door "Dollars for Democrats" campaign, which made me appreciate, even back then, that
it is easier to raise campaign funds in large chunks than in small bites of one dollar at a time.
6 United States v. Nat'l. Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); see
generally, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. Section 431, et seq.7See, e.g. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding protection of subversive or
revolutionary advocacy of force and violence short of imminent and likely incitement
thereof); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); (finding protection
against prior restraint of "The Pentagon Papers" since government had not met its "heavy
burden ofjustification" for such a restriction of public discussion); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (granting press broad immunity to comment about politicians
without fear of libel suits, in recognition of the "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (finding "no test
of reasonableness" can save a statute that makes it a crime for a newspaper to editorially
endorse a political candidate on Election Day.); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(holding protection of even the most vulgar form of language used in public in a political
setting).
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law, could the Government file a lawsuit to suppress that very same citizen
criticism of government?
The answer, of course, was campaign finance reform. The government was
suing under the brand new Federal Election Campaign Act of 19718 The
government's theory was that the two-page ad - even though it spoke solely about
issues - mentioned, criticized or praised people who were candidates for election
that year and that this might affect public opinion, which, in turn, might somehow
influence the outcome of the federal elections that year. Accordingly, this rendered
this ad hoc group a "political committee," which had to file reports with the
government and disclose their contributors and supporters, and, if they failed to do
so, they would be enjoined from further political speech until they complied.
In addition, to the extent that the advertisement could be interpreted as "on
behalf of" those political figures who were praised and/or "in derogation of" those
officials who were criticized, not only did such content render the group a
regulatable political committee, but the Act and implementing regulations imposed
new controls on the placement of such messages in the news media. The rationale
of the provision was to enforce a new statutory ceiling on communication media
expenditures by federal candidates. But the effect of the rules was that newspapers,
magazines, electronic broadcasters and virtually any other medium of mass
communication could not even accept for publication such independent citizen
political communication unless proper certifications had been provided by the
candidates who benefitted from the message - either because they were praised or
because their opponents were criticized. For any news medium to run such
advertisements without such proper certification - which as a practical matter would
be impossible to obtain - would constitute a criminal offense by the news medium.
A harsher example of a system of prior restraint could hardly be imagined.9
In one sense, though, the government was right. Speech like that might
influence people's opinion about Members of Congress, about incumbent
'The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431, et. seq. Most of the more
sweeping provisions that would be at issue in Buckley were passed three years later as the
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.
9 United States v. Nat'l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d. at 1142. That separate
provision, operating directly on the press, but restraining both the press and the independent
speakers, was directly challenged and found facially unconstitutional in American Civil
Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court); vacated
as moot, sub. nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). The
New York Times supported the ACLU in that challenge to the media certification provision.
1999]
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politicians, about the President of the United States, and that, in turn, might
influence their vote at the polls and, ultimately, the outcome of the election. And
if one is serious about regulating the sources of campaign funding, then those
"issue ads" cannot be allowed to slip by. The anti-Nixon, impeachment
advertisement cost $18,000. Adjusted for inflation, that would be about $50,000
today. That is serious money. So if we are to be serious about controlling political
funding, and limiting those who do "too much" of it, or "leveling the playing field,"
or guarding against people using money to "buy access and influence," then we
better be prepared to face the prospect of going after people like the ad hoc
impeachment group with injunctions and fines and maybe even criminal penalties
for pooling their resources and speaking out on the public issues of the day and the
public officials involved in those issues.
And if all that has a familiar ring to it, and sounds, in the words of that great
modem philosopher, Yogi Berra, "like deja vu all over again," it is because
legislative proposals on the front burner today - most notably the McCain-Feingold
bill in the United States Senate, and the Shays-Meehan bill which passed the House
during the summer of 1998 - would achieve virtually the same kinds of controls on
political speech that were at issue and rejected twenty-five years ago in the
impeachment ad case.1°
'°The most recent version of the McCain-Feingold bill is § 26, The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 1999. See 145 Cong. Rec. § 396 (January 19, 1999). To give some flavor
of how sweeping the multiple page bill is, here are excerpts from a press release issued from
Senator McCain's office on the day the bill was introduced and describing key features of
the bill. With regard to "soft money":
The central component of McCain-Feingold, this provision would
prohibit all soft money contributions to the national political parties from
corporations, labor unions and wealthy individuals. In addition, state
parties that are permitted under state law to accept these unregulated
contributions would be prohibited from spending them on activities
relating to federal elections such as voter registration within 120 days of
a federal election, get out the vote campaigns, and campaign advertising
that mentions a federal candidate. In addition, federal candidates would
be prohibited from raising soft money in connection with a federal
election. The bill also prohibits the parties from raising money for or
transferring money to tax-exempt organizations.
Id.
With regard to "issue advocacy:"
The Snowe-Jeffords amendment, adopted as part of McCain-Feingold
during the Senate's February 1998 campaign finance debate, address the
[Vol. 33:1
BUCKLEY V. VALEO
That impeachment advertisement case was a wake-up call to the ferocious
First Amendment problems that campaign finance laws could pose. Now, 25 years
later, the issues of money, politics, free speech, and, indeed, democracy itself,
remain very much the same.
But that is getting a little bit ahead of the story.
In the impeachment ad case, in 1972, the court ruled that campaign finance
laws could not be used against non-partisan, issue-oriented groups engaged in
public commentary about the political issues of the day and the public officials
involved in those issues. Another prominent court came to a similar conclusion one
year later and invalidated the application of the relevant provisions of the Federal
explosion of thinly-veiled campaign advertising funded by corporate and
union treasuries. These ads skirt federal election law by avoiding the use
of direct entreaties to "vote for" or "vote against" a particular candidate.
The amendment defines a new category of 'electioneering
communications' that refer to a clearly identified candidate or candidates;
appear within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election; and
are broadcast on TV (including cable or satellite) or radio to the
candidate's electorate. This definition would NOT include any printed
communication, direct mail, voter guides, or the Internet. The
amendment prohibits unions and for-profit corporations from directly or
indirectly making electioneering communications using treasury funds.
Only voluntarily contributed PAC money could be used for these types
of communications. The amendment permits 501(c)(4) non-profit
corporations to make electioneering communications as long [as] they use
only individual contributions (not corporate or union funds) and make
certain disclosures. The amendment prevents unions or corporations from
laundering funds through non-profits to make electioneering
communications. The amendment provides for disclosure by groups
making electioneering communications that total $10,000 or more in an
election cycle. The group must disclose its identity, the cost of the
communication, and the names and addresses of all contributors of $500
or more to the sponsor of the communication within the cycle... .The
amendment makes clear that electioneering communications that are
coordinated with a federal candidate or a political party committee are
contributions to that candidate or party committee.
Id.
Although the bill exempts print media messages, it otherwise would reach precisely the kind
of message contained in the impeachment ad case.
1999)
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Election Campaign Act to groups like the ACLU whose "major purpose" was the
discussion of public issues, not the election of political candidates."
C. Campaign Finance Reform Run Riot
Within a year, we had Watergate revelations of campaign funding excesses,
and even though much of that occurred before effective disclosure went into effect,
Congress was stampeded into enacting the sweeping 1974 restrictions on political
activity that would give rise to the constitutional challenge in Buckley v. Valeo. In
an atmosphere filled with the same kind of rhetoric that we hear today about how
money is corrupting politics and destroying democracy, Congress passed a law that
was the archetype of government control of political funding and therefore of
political speech, association and communication. And that meant government
control, ultimately, of democracy itself, because, as the Supreme Court has told us
time and again, freedom of political speech is the engine of democracy: "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government."
12
That law 13 severely restricted candidates, campaigns, contributors,
independent political groups, and even non-partisan issue groups like the ACLU,
who had just been assured by the courts that their advocacy would be free of official
restraint. And enforcement of those new restrictions was placed in the hands of a
commission completely dominated and controlled by the House and Senate - a
cynical breach of traditional separation of powers principles that the Buckley Court
would soon declare invalid.
14
" United States v. Nat'l Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (1972); American Civil
Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D. D. C. 1973) The validity of the "major
purpose" test, as a constitutionally-required or statutorily-based limiting gloss on the
applicability of the federal election campaign laws to non-partisan groups was before the
Court more recently in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), but the Court did not reach or
decide the issue.
12Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
3That law, the Federal Election of 1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et.
seq. [herinafter '71 Act], was amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974, PuB. L. No. 93-443; supra note 8.
S4Indeed, the portion of Buckley which unanimously invalidated the manner in which
members of the Federal Election Commission were appointed because of the substantial
powers they were given set the tone for two decades of Supreme Court rulings finding that
various corner-cutting government mechanisms that Congress had established in ways that
departed from the specific design of the Constitution's separation and balance of powers
were unconstitutional. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976); see also Northern
[Vol. 33:1
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(1) The Act severely restricted a candidate's overall campaign expenditures, even
if the funding all came from small contributions. Even many Buckley critics might
concede that the spending limits in the Act were unconscionably low and
incumbent-protective. 15 The spending limit for House races was $70,000, an
extremely low figure even by 1974 standards, and an amount less than the amount
that each House members spent on the average on the free mail frank and
constituent services.
(2) The Act severely limited the amount of money candidates could contribute to
their own campaigns, even though candidates could not possibly corrupt
themselves. Had they used their money to run for the White House, Ross Perot and
Steve Forbes would have wound up in the Big House.
(3) Perhaps even worse, independent speakers were all but completely silenced by
the new law which placed a ceiling of $1,000 on how much any person could spend
on what we now call "independent expenditures." That was about the cost of a one-
quarter page ad in The New York Times, criticizing or praising the President of the
United States. Spend a dime more on political speech and your free speech would
become a felony. What a breathtaking and extraordinary restriction. This
unprecedented provision was justified as a "loophole-closing device" which would
prevent political supporters who could no longer make large contributions directly
to candidates from making large independent expenditures instead. Of course, the
loophole being closed was essentially the First Amendment itself and its guarantee
of no Congressional abridgements of "the freedom of speech." Only Justice Byron
White would have sustained this remarkable provision. Today, $1,000 would
barely buy a tombstone ad on the front page of The New York Times. Had this
provision been sustained and unchanged, it would effectively have eliminated the
use of editorial advertisements by citizens to criticize incumbent officials and
political candidates.
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1982); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Clinton v. New York, 118
S. Ct. 1551 (1998). The only major statute upheld against a separation of powers challenge
was one of the other great post-Watergate "reforms" which would cure corruption and
unaccountable power forever, namely, the Independent Counsel Act. Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
15 Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution: A Critical Look at Buckley v. Valeo,
1997: Hearings on Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform Before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 105"' Congress (1997) (statement by
Burt Neubome, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at New York University and Legal
Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequence, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390 (1994).
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(4) Make the smallest of campaign donations and you would get your name and
political affiliation publicly disclosed or kept on file with the government.1 6 Even
controversial, minor and third parties that the government spent a lot of time and
money spying on, would have to disclose their most modest contributors, although
that might subject such individuals to harassment and retaliation.17
(5) All the issue-oriented groups that report and comment on the records of
incumbents up for re-election would likewise have to file reports with the
government disclosing their contributors and supporters. Indeed, the sweeping
reforms included one provision specifically targeted on issue advocacy groups that
rate and provide "box scores" about how members of Congress vote on issues of
concern to the individual groups.18 Challenged along with the other key provisions
16The '71 Act required covered political committees and organizations to disclose the names
and addresses of all individuals who contributed more than $100 and to keep on file the
names and address of all individuals who contributed as little as $11. Federal Election of
1971, Public Law 92-255, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, et. seq.
17In Buckley, though sustaining the disclosure provisions on their face, the Court did indicate
that where controversial political parties or groups could make a credible showing that
disclosure would lead to harassment and disruption, they might be constitutionally immune
from compliance with campaign reporting and disclosure rules. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
That principle would be applied six years later to hold that campaign committees formed
by parties like the Socialist Workers' Party would be immune from effective disclosure.
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982).
"
1That section was § 437a of the Act, 2 U.S.C. codified at § 437 (a). Its rather clumsy
language provided as follows:
Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or commits
any act directed to the public for the purpose of influencing the outcome
of an election, or who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material
referring to a candidate (by name, description, or other reference)
advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, setting forth the
candidate's position on any public issue, his voting record, or other
official acts (in the case of a candidate who holds or has held Federal
office), or otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes
for or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such
candidate shall file reports with the Commission as if such person were
a political committee. The reports filed by such person shall set forth the
source of the funds used in carrying out any activity described in the
preceding sentence in the same detail as if the funds were contributions
within the meaning of section 431 (e) of this title, and payments of such
funds in the same detail as if they were expenditures within the meaning
of section 431 (f) of this title. The provisions of this section do not apply
to any publication or broadcast of the United States Government or to any
[Vol. 33:1
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of the Act, that section was unanimously declared unconstitutional by a D.C. Circuit
which was enthralled by every other significant feature of the law. Only that
section drew the complete condemnation of judges spanning the ideological
spectrum from Bazelon and Wright to Tamm and Wilkey. The en banc D.C. Circuit
unanimously ruled the provision defectively vague and overbroad for seeking to
regulate core and vital issue speech unconnected to the specific cause of any
candidate.' 9 It was an impermissible restriction of citizen and organizational speech
about important public issues. The Government did not take an appeal from that
ruling and the section was allowed to die, only to see attempts at resurrection in
recent years.20
news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of
a broadcasting station or a bona fide newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical publication.
Id.
'
9Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc).
2 01t has not gone remarked sufficiently that key elements of the various bills like McCain-
Feingold or Shays-Meehan seek to regulate issue advocacy in language virtually
indistinguishable from § 437a which was roundly and conclusively condemned as
unconstitutional in Buckley. They are virtually reincarnations of that flawed and condemned
provision. As one commentator recently put it:
Section 437a has the distinction of being the only section of the post-
Watergate reforms struck down by what, at the time, was the most liberal
pro- campaign finance regulation court in the country. Even to that
naturally sympathetic court, Section 437a was beyond the constitutional
pale. In fact, the section was so indefensible that its overturning was not
appealed to the Supreme Court by any of its defenders, including the
Department of Justice, the FEC, or their allied reform groups (including
Common Cause). Even though the question was not presented directly,
the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, firmly
enunciated the principles that led the D.C. Circuit to strike down Section
437a. The Supreme Court noted that: The distinction between discussion
of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates
may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative
proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign
on the basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns
themselves generate issues of public interest. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court set forth in Buckley the holding, which is valid to this day, that
only speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly
identified candidates may be subjected to certain forms of regulation,
including compulsory disclosure to the government.
Jan Witold Baran, The Reform That Cannot and Should Not Ever Happen, LEGAL TIMES,
1999]
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But otherwise, the lower court upheld the major features of the new act.
How could this sweeping monitoring and control of political speech and activity
possibly be called "reform?" Especially since as breathtaking as the law was in
terms of the political activity it sought to control, it was no less cynical in what it
exempted from those controls. The most outrageous exemption was for the costs
of free franked mail, which by itself, gave incumbent House Members more money
to spend on political communication with their constituents than the whole amount
that a challenger was allowed to spend on his or her entire campaign under the new
spending limits. 21 How is that creating a level playing field for incumbents?
To groups like the ACLU, these did not seem to be genuine reforms that
would expand political participation and opportunity. Rather, they seemed more
to be an unprecedented Incumbent Protection Act. They would suppress the
individual and group political advocacy which is at "the core of our electoral
process and of the First Amendment freedoms,22 and which is the very engine of
democracy. That is why House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt could not have
been more wrong when he insisted that: "What we have is two important values in
direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for healthy campaigns in a healthy
democracy .... You can't have both., 23 In fact, and in law, there cannot be one
without the other.
D. The Triumph of Reason
That was the statutory scheme that the Court had before it in Buckley,
which has been severely criticized and even demonized.24 While certainly not
without its flaws, the decision, properly considered, is a landmark of political
freedom.25 The Court correctly recognized that limitations on political funding are
Feb. 23, 1998, at S.36. That court ruling calls into severe question many of the proposals
today to control issue group spending and thereby speaking.
21 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))
(emphasis added).23Nancy Gibbs, The Wake- Up Call: Clinton Makes Serious Noises About Campaign Reform,
But That May Not Be Enough To Change A Cozy System That Loves Special-Interest Money,
TIME, Feb. 3, 1997, at p. 22.
24 Supra note 2.25For a particularly powerful and relatively contemporary paean to the wisdom of the
Buckley decision, see Scot Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 243 (1982).
[Vol. 33:1
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limitations on political speech and thereby threatened well-established principles
at the core of the First Amendment's protection.
To the argument that money is not speech, the Court quite sensibly
responded that limitations on how much one could spend to speak were limitations
on how much one could speak. Whether the subject is funding for political speech
or funding for the arts or funding for abortion counseling or funding for legal
services programs - or funding for campaign finance reform advocacy - there is an
obvious and inextricable link between restrictions on funding and restrictions on
speech, and the Buckley Court soundly recognized that: "A restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during
a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.,26  Indeed, in cases both before and after Buckley, the Court has
consistently understood that efforts to restrain the funding of speech are tantamount
to efforts to restrain the speech itself and has applied the Buckley principles to
invalidate such schemes.27 Such rulings were particularly appropriate since the
26One of the abiding ironies of the campaign finance reform debate is that so many who
attack the Court for "equating" money with speech haven't the slightest hesitation to use
their own, often unlimited resources to argue that money is not speech. Presumably the
unimaginably wealthy proponents of controlling campaign funding have no embarrassment
about using their own extraordinary resources to communicate that message. Either they fail
to see the irony or prefer the adage of fighting fire with fire. Groups urging efforts to take
private money out of politics have no hesitation to take millions of dollars of private money
to put forth their message. See Dierdre Shesgreen, But Proliferation of Groups Doesn't
Spur Progress in Curbing Political Cash, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at p. 1. One article
observed that George Soros, the billionaire philanthropist, gave $3,000,000 to Public
Campaign, a group which argues that the wealthy have too much influence over our public
life. See Greg Pierce, Double Standard, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1997, p. A10. The
billionaire financier, Jerome Kohlberg, supports a campaign finance reform organization
which spent $400,000 to try to defeat a Senate candidate whose politics he did not like. See
Ruth Marcus, The Advocates Pipe Down the Ads, WASH. POST, October 23, 1998, p. A 10.
Of course, the most chronic examples of irony are the multimillionaire owners of the
nation's newspapers, most of whom editorially and passionately support funding controls
on others, while using their own extensive wealth to fund their newspapers and magazines
to make that point. See Ira Glasser, Campaign "Reform" LimitsSpeech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 1998, p. A. 24.27The cases before Buckley include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(holding the fact that political advertisement is paid for does not justify depriving it of First
Amendment protection); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (finding the fact that
abortion services advertisement is paid for does not justifying withdrawing First
Amendment protection). Since Buckley, the Court has applied its principle numerous times
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restrictions in Buckley and similar cases were on the use of private funds and
resources to communicate private political messages, not on the use of public funds
to facilitate those messages.2"
To the claim, relentlessly repeated today, that there is "too much" campaign
spending and that it must be controlled by government, the Court responded that the
First Amendment fundamentally denies government the right to make that choice:
The First Amendment denies government the
power to determine that spending to promote
one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or
unwise. In the free society ordained by our
Constitution, it is not the government but the
people -- individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political
committees - who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign.29
Who would quarrel with that principle?
To the claim that the free speech of those with more resources could be
restrained in order to enhance the political opportunity of those with less resources -
to invalidate statutes and rules which attempted to restrain speech by restraining the funding
of that speech. See, e.g. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 119 S. Ct.
636(1999) (invalidating, inter alia, rule that paid petition-signature collectors had to disclose
sources of funding); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454
(1995) (invalidating rule that federal employees could not be paid honorariums for giving
speeches or writing articles while off-duty); Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating rule that prevented
criminals from receiving money for writing or speaking about his or her crime); Meyer v.
Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (invalidating rule that prohibited paying people to circulate
petitions to get signatures to put a voter initiative on the ballot).28In the more complex area of government efforts to control the speech uses of public funds,
the Court has also recognized the important link between money and speech, but has been
far too willing to let the government use its power of the purse to control the speech of those
it patronizes. The issues were addressed most prominently by the Court in National
Endowment v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), which upheld certain vague government
restraints on governmentally funded art subsidized by the NEA.29Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
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a kind of First Amendment Lowest Common Denominator, a principle for leveling
down freedom of speech - the Court responded:
The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered
exchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and societal changes desired by the
people.3°
That too embodies settled doctrine. Buckley critics often stress the first part of this
quote, to create the impression that the decision is some kind of royalist ruling,
while underplaying the second portion of the quote which makes it clear that the
evil of restricting some speakers is the consequent restraint on public discussion and
the instrumental role of freedom of speech and press.
Finally, in answering the claim that issue-oriented speech about incumbent
politicians must be regulated because it might influence public opinion and thereby
affect the outcome of elections, the Court, with great force, reminded us of the
critical relationship between unfettered issue advocacy and healthy democracy.
"Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. ''31 And with equal clarity, the Court observed that in an election
season one cannot abstractly discuss issues without discussing the candidates and
their stands on those issues.
The distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
candidates may often dissolve in practical
application. Candidates, especially incumbents,
are intimately tied to public issues involving
legislative proposals and governmental actions.
Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of
their positions on various public issues, but
3
°Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (emphasis added).31424 U.S. at 14. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
1999]
AKRON LAW REVIEW
campaigns themselves generate issues of public
interest.32
If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue rendered the
speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the consequences for
First Amendment rights would be intolerable.33
Accordingly, in order to protect First Amendment rights, the Court
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" requirement, which holds that only the
funding of express advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to restraint. All
speech which does not in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate must remain totally free of any regulation: "So long as persons
and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want
to promote the candidate and his views. 3 4 The Court thus reaffirmed two
principles which are critical to today's debate over campaign finance regulation:
1) The area in which campaign finance controls may operate has to be narrowly and
carefully and clearly defined; and, 2) Outside of such area of permissible
regulation, no, to repeat, no controls are allowable. These principles, which seem
almost self-evident, are nonetheless once again threatened by legislative proposals
32Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.33For example:
[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of
invitation would miss that mark is a question both of
intent and of effect. No speaker, in such circumstances,
safely could assume that anything he might say upon
the general subject would not be understood by some
as an invitation. In short, the supposedly clear-cut
distinction between discussion, laudation, general
advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these
circumstances wholly at the mercy of the varied
understanding of his hearers and consequently of
whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and
meaning. Such a distinction offers no security for free
discussion. In these conditions it blankets with
uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the
speaker to hedge and trim.
Id. at 43 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
34424 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
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like McCain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan pending in Washington and in many
States.35
E. Compromise Controls
Those portions of Buckley which struck limits on campaign funding
vindicated core First Amendment rights in ways that justify praise and certainly do
not merit the condemnation that Buckley routinely receives. But other parts of the
Court's decision bear the hallmark of judicial compromise and have created a
regime of partial regulation which has become the epitome of unintended and
undesirable consequences.
First, while striking down limits on expenditures by candidates, political
committees or individuals, the Court reversed field and upheld limits on
contributions by individuals to political candidates and campaign committees. The
Court did so because of its sense that restraints on contributions were less severe
than those on expenditures, while more directly implicating concerns with the
actual or potential or apparent corrupting effect of "large" contributions on political
candidates who are and/or will become public officials. Though noting that the
"Act's contributions and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most
fundamental First Amendment activities,, 36 the Court nonetheless concluded that
limits on campaign contributions are somehow "lesser" restraints because
contributions are one step removed from speech compared to expenditures, the
amount of a contribution does not add appreciably to the message of support it
embodies and contributors are free to spend unlimited amounts to promote their
chosen candidate or cause directly and independently.37 With respect to corruption,
the Court stated that:
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary
purpose - to limit the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual
financial contributions - in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the
$1,000 contribution limitation. [T]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure
political quid pro quos from current and potential
3 Supra note 7.36Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,14 (1976).
371d. at 35.
1999]
AKRON LAW REVIEW
officeholders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.38
The Court's upholding of contribution limits gave insufficient weight to a
number of critical arguments pressed by the challengers. First, a restraint on
contributions would become a defacto restraint on expenditures, especially for those
candidates who are not well-connected or well-heeled. The primary beneficiaries
of the upholding of contribution limits have been personally wealthy candidates
who do not need the kindness of strangers and incumbents who have more than
enough "friends" or groups of friends, i.e. PACs, to help fund them. That is one
reason why incumbency rates have remained extremely high.
Second, unless adjusted for inflation - which they have not been - those
contribution limits make it harder and harder for candidates, especially challengers,
to raise funds to get their message out. Indeed, a number of lower courts have
recently invalidated "reform" enactments that lowered contributions limits to levels
as low as $250 or even $100, reasoning that such Draconian restraints made it all
but impossible for non-wealthy candidates to raise funds for their campaigns.3 9
Some courts have even held that a $1,000 contribution limit - the exact amount
sustained in Buckley, but equivalent today to a $320 ceiling in 1976 terms - failed
to survive strict scrutiny where it was set at such a low level - in effect $320 in 1976
dollars - that it bore no rational relationship to deterring corruption, especially
where the limits were put into place in the absence of any record of corruption
remotely comparable to that presented in Buckley. Indeed, the Court has granted
review in one of those cases, placing on the table the question of how relatively low
contribution limits can be sustained 25 years after Buckley.4
3 Id. at 27.
39National Black Police Assfn v. District of Columbia Board of Election and Ethics, 924 F
Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1996) vacated as moot, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1997), aff'd, 168 F.3d
525 (D.C. Cir. 1999); California Profile Council PAC v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1295
(E.D. Cal. 1998), afftd, 164 F.3d 1189 (9t Cir. 1999). But see: Kentucky Right to Life, Inc.
v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645-651 (6tb Cir. 1997).
4°The case is Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), where the lower court invalidated contribution limits of $250 for state
assembly, $500 for state Senate and $1,000 for statewide office. The Court denied certiorari
in two cases from Ohio directly challenging Buckley's ruling that you cannot have
expenditure limits. Those two cases would have permitted the Court directly to consider the
validity of Buckley's disallowence of expenditure limits. Kruse v. City of Cincinnatti, 142
F.3d 907 (6' Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 511 (1998) (striking a Cincinnati ordinance
which limited expenditures in City Council races and which was intended to be a test case
of Buckley); Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 528-533 (6'' Cir. 1998), cert.denied 119 S.
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Third, the challengers claimed that the tight controls over contributions
would cause campaign funding to flow to areas of political communication which
were not subject to those restraints, most notably, issue advocacy and political party
activity funded by "soft money," which is funding precisely not limited to $1,000
from individuals. The Court seemed unmoved by these concerns. But the
phenomena of issue advocacy and soft money - and proposals to control both -have
dominated campaign finance debate and proposals in recent years.
Moreover, the Court gave insufficient attention to the argument that there
were less drastic alternatives to deal with the actuality and potential of corruption
than the problematic use of contribution limits. The major suggestion was the use
of effective disclosure of large contributions to candidates and campaign
committees so that the public would have the means to ferret out whatever undue
access and influence might possibly be accorded to campaign contributors. But the
Court concluded that full disclosure, coupled with laws against bribery and conflict
of interest and the activities of a vigorous free press, was an insufficient inoculation
or antidote to corruption or the appearance of corruption.41
Finally, the Court also sustained a scheme of public funding for Presidential
candidates. That, too, has been a mixed blessing. Of course, public funding can be
an important antidote to the concerns with corruption from private contributions,
and the proper kind of public funding can expand the spectrum of political
Ct. 890 (1999) (invalidating campaign expenditure limits for judicial elections).4 1Often overlooked in the debates about Buckley is the fact that the Court also upheld against
constitutional challenge the Act's sweeping and overbroad disclosure requirements. As
indicated above, campaign contributors of as little as $101 dollars - equivalent to $32 today
-would have to be automatically publicly disclosed. Contributors who gave as little as $11 -
about $3.50 today - would have their names stored for supplying to the government upon
demand. While the challengers argued that disclosure was a less drastic and more
democratic remedy to the concerns with corruption and undue access and influence, the
argument was limited to "large" contributions to mainline candidates and parties where there
was a real impact. Instead, the Court, though acknowledging that compelled disclosure can
substantially interfere with freedom of association, sustained the wide-sweeping disclosure
that invades an extremely broad area of political privacy without any sufficient justification.
The Court felt that the low disclosure levels were reasonable attempts to detect patterns of
giving and to discourage violations of the contribution limits. Though the Court did show
some sensitivity to the plight of controversial minor parties, which would lead to a later
ruling that such groups did not have to disclose their contributors and supporters, See Brown
v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982) the Court nonetheless
upheld the facial validity of the disclosure rules.
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participation and opportunity in a very meaningful way. The Court recognized that
potential, but the scheme it upheld contained two serious flaws.
First, the funding arrangement is basically designed to benefit the two
major political parties and their candidates, with a premium on past electoral
success as a measure of current public benefit. Minor parties and new candidates
basically need not apply for pre-election funding. The Court sustained this scheme
against an Equal Protection challenge. Second, the funding arrangement requires
eligible candidates to limit their overall and state-by-state expenditures in order to
get primary matching funds. In order to get general election funds, presidential
candidates have to agree not to raise or spend even $1.00 of private money.
That stipulation, in turn, has had two consequences. First, it has
legitimized, without serious consideration, a form of "unconstitutional conditions"
whereby candidates must give up all rights to raise and spend private funds in order
to receive public campaign funds. This has guaranteed that almost all public
funding proposals pressed at the federal level and enacted at the state and local level
will have strings attached and, in all likelihood, will benefit incumbents over
challengers because the arrangements are limits-driven.42
Second, and most notably, the conditioned limits on public funding have
led inexorably to the soft money phenomenon and to the rise of "soft money" and
multi- million dollar party "issue campaigns" run to skirt those limits.
F. Lessons for the Future
If there is any lesson we should have learned from 25 years of campaign
finance controls; it is that limits on campaign funding, apart from constitutional
questions, have an equally critical flaw: they just do not work.
Trying to equalize political opportunity and influence through limiting
political speech and association is a futile task. Limit the funding of the candidates
equally, and the advantage of incumbency or celebrity will disturb the equilibrium,
as will the presence of powerful outside voices, independent political groups, labor
unions, issue groups and the news media.43 Limit wealthy contributors from giving
42Kathleen M. Sullivan, Reply: Political Money and Freedom of Speech: A Reply to Frank
Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083 (1998); See also Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6h Cir.
1998) (upholding triggered public funding.)43Michael Janofsky, Gore Building Network in California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999,
Section 1, Page 24. See also Bernard Weinraub, Hollywood Raises Curtain on 2000, N.Y.
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money to candidates, and they will still be able to buy newspapers, fund issue
groups and give large amounts of "soft money" to get their message out in ways that
the average person can never hope to equal. The ability of a George Soros or a
Rupert Murdock to use their vast funds to influence the debate on political
candidates and public issues for example, campaign finance reform - is limitless
compared to the average citizen. Attempt to limit all those voices and methods of
influencing the electorate, on the claim that they are "buying elections" or
"drowning out the voice of the people" and you have a First Amendment
meltdown.44
Far better to deal with such disparities by encouraging average people to
band together in groups to support issues and candidates that appeal to them to
counter the wealthy few. That is what freedom of speech and association are all
about.
The 1974 law limited individual contributions to House and Senate
candidates, and we have witnessed a proliferation of PACs, and independent groups
and issue advocacy. Challengers have a hard time raising money and incumbents
are more insulated against effective challenge. Things are easy only for the well-
heeled or the well-connected.
The law sharply limited contributions to Presidential candidates, and we
have seen the splurge of soft money funding that has gone on for almost 20 years.
TIMES, February 20, 1999, A8 (noting that both Democratic and Republican Presidential
hopefuls "troop in almost every week to gather support from the rich and super-rich" among
the Hollywood and entertainment industry moguls.) Compare the remark in Buckley that
public financing of presidential elections would be "a means of eliminating the improper
influence of large private contributions.... " Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96.
44Some scholars think that controls on wealthy media owners or other speakers in the service
of campaign finance reform and equalization would justify restraints on such publishers.
See Richard Hasen Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 1627 (1999) (arguing that it would be permissible to cover media under campaign
finance laws, especially if the equality of political opportunity theme rejected in Buckley
were adopted by the Court, See also, Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:
An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1
(1996); Scott E. Thomas, Corporate Funds: Use in Campaign Banned, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, March 12, 1999, at A15 (Letter to Wall Street Journal from Scott Thomas,
Commissioner of the FEC, justifying the proceeding (later dropped) against Steve Forbes
for that portion of his monthly magazine column deemed partisan and not issue-oriented).
Normal First Amendment instincts are fundamentally averse to such government micro
management of media and politics.
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The highly structured system of public financing of Presidential elections, hailed
as a model of reform, has become the poster child of the failure of limits-driven
public campaign funding controls. Political parties have spent millions of dollars
on "image ads" to influence public opinion in ways favorable to their party or
candidate. Make no mistake, the millions of dollars spent by the Democratic Party
on such ads effectively decided the outcome of the 1996 Presidential campaign in
favor of President Clinton before that campaign had even officially begun.
The Court's split decision in Buckley has helped create the campaign
finance dilemma we have had ever since. Wealthy candidates can spend unlimited
funds on campaigns, while less wealthy candidates are severely limited in trying to
raise funds from others to get their message out. Incumbents have built-in fund-
raising advantages, while non-wealthy challengers must scramble for funds. People
or organizations who want to give financial support directly to candidates and
parties are restrained from doing so, but permitted to support issue advocacy or
"soft money" party activity without restraint. Public funding is available but only
primarily to mainstream parties and candidates and only with acceptance of limiting
conditions and stipulations.
G. "Reform" Makes a Comeback
The current "reform" bills pending in Washington and many of the States
embody the same kind of limits-based approach that has failed time and again in the
past. "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
45
Two particular features of many of these bills require analysis: the
unprecedented controls on issue advocacy and soft money.
H. Issue Advocacy
The bills' unprecedented regulations of issue advocacy are flatly
unconstitutional under settled First Amendment rules. And no amount of pejorative
references to "phony" issue ads or "so-called" issue ads or "sham" issue ads can
avoid that fact.
45George Santayana, The Life of Reason; Vol I, Reason in Common Sense, quoted in
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, p. 7 0 3 (1982). This year's version of McCain-Feingold
is S. 26, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999. See supra note 7. The Shays-
Meehan parallel bill in the House is H.R. 2183.
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The Court fashioned the express advocacy doctrine to safeguard issue
advocacy from campaign finance controls, even though such advocacy might
influence the outcome of an election. The doctrine provides a bright-line, objective
test that protects political speech by focusing solely on the content of the speaker's
words, not the motive in the speaker's mind or the impact on the speaker's audience,
or the proximity to an election, or the phase of the moon. The doctrine protects
issue discussion and advocacy by allowing citizens to criticize the performance of
elected officials at the time that such commentary is most vital in a democracy:
during an election season. It may be inconvenient for incumbent politicians when
groups of citizens spend money to inform the voters about a politician's public
stands on controversial issues like term limits, but it is of the essence of free speech
and democracy.
The McCain-Feingold bill and the Shays-Meehan bill both abandon the
clear and narrow test of express advocacy in favor of an impermissibly expanded
definition of that critical term in an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad fashion.
* They impose, in effect, a two-month, 60-day blackout before any federal
election for any radio or television advertisement on any issue if that
communication is one that in any way "refers to" any federal candidate. 46
Incumbents love that one. Indeed, such proposals have spawned a public policy
phrase, to "deep sixty" a bill, namely, to introduce it within sixty days of an
election, thereby disabling and silencing any legislative advocacy groups from
commenting on a legislator's views or actions on that bill.
* The bills would restrain any communication "expressing unmistakable
and unambiguous support for or opposition to" any federal candidate.47 If that had
been the law in New York City, for example, and the New York Civil Liberties
Union had run an ad during the fall campaign criticizing candidate Mayor Giuliani's
handling of police brutality issues, that would have been illegal. Police brutality
issues have become pervasive in New York City this year. If McCain-Feingold
type laws were in effect, all organized public commentary on Mayor Giuliani's
police brutality policies would become ensnared in the web of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. So too would an ad run last fall criticizing former Senator
D'Amato's stand on abortion and praising his Democratic opponent, Congressman,
now Senator Charles Schumer. Indeed, there were many ads during that election
claiming that, despite his rhetoric, Senator D'Amato was actively anti-choice.
Under the proposed legislation, such communications informing the public about
46 S. 26, 106" Cong. Section 201(3) (1999).471d. at Section 211.
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vital issues of the day would be run through the meat grinder of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.
Indeed, that is the basic purpose of bills like McCain-Feingold, namely, to
take issue and party speech which is currently beyond the pale of regulation and
bring it within the command and control system of the Act. The clear purpose and
inevitable effect of such unprecedented restrictions on issue advocacy will be to
dampen citizen criticism of incumbent officeholders standing for re-election at the
very time when the public's attention is especially focused on such issues.
These bills are in clear violation of First Amendment principles. Such bills
would impose unprecedented federal government controls on critical speech about
incumbent politicians at the very time when such commentary is most vital in a
democracy: during an election season. The bill would stifle such speech by a
radical expansion of the Supreme Court's constitutional definition of what political
speech can be subject to campaign finance controls, namely, only speech which
"expressly advocates" the election or defeat of political candidates. The result
would be to bring under federal election controls all of the individuals and
organizations whose speech has been constitutionally immune, i.e. "free," from any
restraint up to now. It would treat such groups as though they were a PAC or
partisan organization, and would subject them to all of the restraints applicable to
campaign organizations.
These proposals embody the kind of unprecedented restraint on issue
advocacy that violates bedrock First Amendment principles, set forth with great
clarity in Buckley and reaffirmed by numerous Supreme Court and lower court
rulings ever since. Indeed, one of the enduring legacies of the Buckley decision is
its reaffirmation and strengthening of the indispensable First Amendment principle
that public discussion of public issues is at the very core of the freedom of speech
and of the press.
First, "issue advocacy" is at the core of democracy. In rejecting the claim
that issue-oriented speech about incumbent politicians could be regulated because
it might influence public opinion and affect the outcome of elections, the Buckley
Court reminded us of the critical relationship between unfettered issue advocacy
and healthy democracy: "Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution."
48
4' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
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Second, in an election season, citizens and groups cannot effectively
discuss issues if they are barred from discussing candidates who take stands on
those issues.
For the distinction between discussion of issues
and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat
of candidates may often dissolve in practical
application. Candidates, especially incumbents,
are intimately tied to public issues involving
legislative proposals and governmental actions.
Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of
their positions on various public issues, but
campaigns themselves generate issues of public
interest.49
If any reference to a candidate in the context of advocacy on an issue
rendered the speaker or the speech subject to campaign finance controls, the
consequences for First Amendment rights would be intolerable.
Third, to guard against that stifling censorial overbreadth, the Court
fashioned the critical "express advocacy" doctrine, which holds that only express
advocacy of electoral outcomes may be subject to any form of restraint. Thus, only
"communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate"5" can be subject to any campaign finance controls.
Finally, and most importantly, all speech which does not in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is totally immune
from any regulation; "So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they
are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views."5 1
491d. at 42.
5
°ld. at 44.
511d. at 45 (emphasis added). For almost 25 years, the Federal Election Commission has
repeatedly attempted, in one way or another, to expand the concept of express advocacy well
beyond what the courts have permitted. And the courts have consistently rebuffed the
Commission in cases ranging from Federal Election Comm'n. v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (enbanc) to Right to Life of
Dutchess County v. Federal Election Committee, 6 F. Supp. 2d. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
Indeed, as is well known, in one case the Fourth Circuit even awarded costs and attorneys
fees to an organization harassed by the Commission for what was clearly and purely issue
speech. Federal Election Comm'n. v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th
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Nor does it matter whether the issue advocacy is communicated on radio
or television, in newspapers or magazines, through direct mail or printed pamphlets.
What counts for constitutional purposes is not the medium, but the message. By the
same token, it is constitutionally irrelevant whether the message costs $100 or
$1,000 or $100,000. It is content, not amount, that marks the constitutional
boundary of allowable regulation and frees issue advocacy from any impermissible
restraint. The control of issue advocacy is simply beyond the pale of legislative
authority .52
This unprecedented provision is an impermissible effort to regulate issue
speech which contains not a whisper of express advocacy, simply because it "refers
to" a federal candidate - who is more often than not a Congressional incumbent -
during an election season. The First Amendment disables Congress from enacting
such a measure regardless of whether the provision includes a monetary threshold,
covers only broadcast media, applies only to speech during an election season and
employs prohibition or disclosure as its primary regulatory device.
Such proposals would cast a pall over grass-roots lobbying and advocacy
communication by non-partisan issue-oriented groups. It would do so by imposing
burdensome, destructive and unprecedented disclosure and organizational
requirements, and barring use of any organizational funding for such
communications if any corporations or unions made any donations to the
organization. Such proposals would force such groups to choose between
abandoning their issue advocacy or dramatically changing their organizational
structure and sacrificing their speech and associational rights.
Other severe problems with such bills are the new "coordination" rules,
rules which will interfere with the ability of issue organizations to communicate
with elected officials on such issues and later communicate to the public in any
manner on such on issues. And the greatly-expanded activities encompassed within
the new category of "express advocacy" would be subject to those greatly-expanded
coordination restrictions as well. This would be a double deterrent to public
discussion: More would be encompassed within the definition of express advocacy
and more discussion with respect to that expanded universe of express advocacy
would be ensnared under the coordination rules. In effect, any person or group who
Cir 1997).52As the Court said a decade before Buckley in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966):
"No test of reasonableness can save a state statute from invalidation as a violation of the
First Amendment if that law makes it a crime for a newspaper editor to do no more than urge
people to vote one way or another in a publicly held election." Id.
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talked with a representative about an issue would be subject to the coordination
rules and restraints if they publicly commented on the representative's stance on
those same issues. And coordinated activity becomes highly controlled activity.
Rules like this could even make tax lawyers jealous.
The net result will be to make it virtually impossible for any issue
organization to communicate, directly or indirectly, with any politician on any issue
and then communicate on that same issue to the public.
All of this will have an exceptionally chilling effect on organized issue
advocacy in America by the hundreds and thousands of groups that enormously
enrich political debate. These bills fly in the face of well-settled Supreme Court
doctrine which is designed to keep campaign finance regulations from ensnaring
and overwhelming all political and public speech. And they will chill issue
discussion of the actions of incumbent officeholders standing for re-election at the
very time when it is most vital in a democracy: during an election season. It may
be inconvenient and annoying for incumbent politicians when groups of citizens
spend money to inform the voters about a politician's public stands on controversial
issues, like abortion, but it is the essence of free speech and democracy.
L Soft Money
The bill would also impose new controls on "soft money" funding of
political parties, thus leaving them far less able to use their resources to
communicate their message to the voters. Elections are a time when we need more
political party speech and activity, not less. "[i]t can hardly be doubted that the
Constitutional guarantee [the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."53
Likewise, the unprecedented and sweeping restraints on "soft money"
funding of issue advocacy and political activity and even a new concept called
"federal election activity" by political parties and non-partisan groups alike also
raise severe First Amendment concerns. 54 These activities go beyond express
advocacy, and beyond even issue advocacy referring to candidate. The Orwellian
concept of regulatable "federal election activity" basically includes things like get-
out-the-vote drives and other electoral activities on the theory that the conduct of
such praiseworthy democratic activity may somehow be politically motivated or
53Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
54 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999, S. 26, 106t' Cong. § 101(B)(2) (1999).
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partisan. Will licensing of all "federal election activity" be next? Or with proposals
like this, is it, in fact, already here.
The same principles that protect unrestrained advocacy by issue groups
safeguard issue advocacy and activity by political parties and other organizations.
"Soft money" is funding that does not support "express advocacy" of the election
or defeat of federal candidates, even though it may exert an influence on the
outcome of federal elections in the broadest sense of that term. As such, it is
presumptively protected against government regulation. It supports political
activity by parties and non-partisan organizations such as voter registration, voter
education and get-out-the-vote drives. Because such funding is not used for express
advocacy, it can be raised from sources that would be restricted in making federal
contributions or expenditures.55
To be sure, to the extent that soft money funds issue advocacy and political
activities by political parties, it becomes something of a hybrid: it supports
protected and unregulatable issue speech, and activities, but by party organizations
often closely tied to candidates and officeholders. But the kind of sweeping controls
on the amount and source of soft money contributions to political parties and
disclosure of soft money disbursements by other organizations raise severe
constitutional problems. Disclosure, rather than limitation, of large soft money
contributions to political parties, but not to other organizations, is the more
appropriate and less restrictive alternative.56
The proposed legislative labyrinth of restrictions on party funding and
political activity can have no other effect but to deter and discourage precisely the
kind of political party activity that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
55 Richard Briffault, Article: Campaign Finance, The Parties and the Court: A Comment on
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 91 (1997); Bradley Smith, The Current Debate Over Soft Money:
Soft Money, Hard Realities, The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J.
LEGIS. 179 (1998).56Many of the key Federal Election Commission restraints on the use of soft money for issue
advocacy are being challenged in a case currently pending in the District of Columbia
Circuit brought by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Democratic Party as
co-plaintiffs. See Republican National Committee v. FEC, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 38361
(1998) (denying a preliminary injunction against FEC regulations).
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J. A Better Proposal for Reform
We are at a constitutional crossroads on campaign finance reform. Read
The New York Times' latest editorial and be left with the sense that if the Congress
does not pass the McCain-Feingold bill by sundown, democracy, not to mention the
Constitution, will be lost forever. Unless the federal government enacts such
measures to clamp down immediately on unregulated "soft money" and "issue
advocacy" and unregistered "federal election activity" and improper "coordination"
between citizens and their elected representatives, the Republic is surely doomed.
The academic and editorial outcry of support for such an overly broad piece of
legislation is almost deafening.
Although McCain-Feingold is unlikely to be passed - let alone be before the
Court - anytime soon, a surrogate for all the command and control mechanisms of
that flawed piece of legislation will be before the Court in the Missouri contribution
limits case.57 The forces of "reform" who brought us the Federal Election
Campaign Act will use that case to insist that low and restrictive contribution limits
must be maintained as the only democratic line of defense against "corruption" and
"undue influence" and the "buying of elections." Should the Court agree and
sustain extremely low legislatively-compelled contribution limits, that judicial
mandate will be used by "reform" forces as the doctrinal pivot to justify attempts
to close every "loophole" in campaign finance controls that can be "plugged" by
reference to the reaffirmed authority to limit campaign contributions. That is
precisely the theory to justify McCain-Feingold's extraordinary expansion of the
range of campaign finance controls by making virtually all political party funding
and most issue advocacy funding and some "federal election activity" funding
subject to the regime of the FECA, particularly its core restraints on the source and
size of political contributions.
For 25 years, those of us associated with the ACLU have urged a different
approach to the campaign finance dilemma, a triad approach based on three
essential principles.
First, raise or even repeal all limits on campaign contributions or
expenditures. They offend the principles of the First Amendment, they distort First
Amendment doctrine, and they simply don't work. Increasingly, there is a growing
amount of editorial and political support for at least raising contribution ceilings to
5 See Shrink Missouri PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519 (8'h Cir. 1998), cert granted, 119 S. Ct.
901 (1999).
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the level of inflation, so that the federal ceiling would be $3,000, not $1,000.58
Except for those extremists who would wish for all political activity to be publicly
funded only, with no right of private contribution or expenditure, no one can justify
on policy grounds the retention of the $1,000 limit for federal campaigns.
Second, insure timely - indeed, instantaneous - and effective disclosure of
large contributions to major political parties and committees, so that the public has
immediate access to this information. And make sure that these disclosures come
out before the election and are widely publicized by the media and watchdog groups
like Common Cause so that we will know before the election about the fund-raising
activities of candidates and their parties. That is the most appropriate and
democratic remedy to deal with the concerns over undue access and influence by
contributors on elected officials. Let the people decide who's too cozy with the fat
cats and the so-called "special interests." Let the people know about the "China
connection" to Presidential fundraising before the election, not after. Let the public
know that the President, who agreed only to use public funding for his political
campaign in 1996, raised funds for and drafted the copy of Democratic Party
campaign advertisements in 1995 that guaranteed his re-election before the official
campaign even began.
Third, provide a meaningful and broad-scale package of serious public
funding and benefits for all qualified political candidates. This is a strategy to
provide floors to support and expand political opportunity, not ceilings to restrict
political activity. That would be a real investment in democracy.
The most effective and least constitutionally problematic route to genuine
campaign finance reform is a system of equitable and adequate public financing.
But proposals for public financing need to avoid certain pitfalls. First, they should
not compel candidates and parties to limit their political speech in order to have that
speech subsidized by government. Instead, the principle should be one of building
floors to support political speech, not ceilings to restrict it. Second, public
financing schemes should avoid mechanisms whereby benefits and subsidies to one
candidate are triggered by the campaign funding and campaign speech activities of
other candidates and even independent groups. Such contingent funding
"Stirrings on Campaign Finance, WASH. POST, March 19, 1999, A28; Time to Reform
Campaign Reforms, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 7, 1999, at p.20; Paul Merrion, Biz Backs
Bid to Curb Soft Money: A New Corporate-Led Bid for Campaign Reform, CRAIN'S
CHICAGO BuSINESS, April 5, 1999, p.3; Even legislative proposals that would ban soft
money entirely, would at least raise the hard money limits on contributions to parties to
make up the shortfall.
[Vol. 33:1
BUCKLEY V. VALEO
arrangements can confer too much power on government to determine what
campaign activities or speech entitles other candidates to increased funds or fund-
raising opportunities. Third, public financing arrangements should be as inclusive
as possible, so that new political voices are enabled, rather than stifled. Finally,
public financing should take a mix of different forms so that candidates and parties
are not dependent on one single governmental funding source.
If a serious public funding program were coupled with an easing of fund
raising restrictions on those candidates who do not opt into the public funding
system, the combination might give candidates a real choice about the best way to
get their messages out and the voters a real choice about which candidates they
prefer.
Here are some of the components of such a campaign finance benefits
package.
* Give modest tax credits of up to $100 or even $500 for private political
contributions to any political party or candidate - Democratic, Republican or
Socialist. Now that would be the most straightforward and democratic form of
public financing of politics -- through private choices, publicly amplified. If 50
million voters gave $100 each, you could fund all of federal politics in a year to the
tune of about $5,000,000,000 without a penny going through government hands.
Now that's a good use of the coming federal budget surplus.
* Give free franked mail privileges to all qualified political candidates, not
just Democrats and Republicans, at least during the general election. Incumbents
get it free for most of their terms in office, why not let challengers have the same
perk during the election season. 59 It would facilitate political communication and
reduce the dependence on private funding. That's a serious way to help level the
playing field between incumbents and challengers.
'9In this regard, the Court's decision allowing broad government regulation of political party
choices regarding the "fusion" tickets was a disappointment. See Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997). So too was the Court's decision allowing public
broadcasting stations broad discretion to exclude a "non-serious" Congressional candidate
from publicly-sponsored televised candidate debates. See Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666 (1998); see generally, Joel Gora, Forbes, Finley and
Free Speech: Does He Who Pays the Piper Always Get to Call the Tune, 15 TOURO L. REV
965 (1999).
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* Make serious amounts of public funding or matching funds available to
all federal candidates.60
* Although posing severe, and perhaps insurmountable, constitutional
difficulties, afford candidates free air time, with no restrictions or conditions, to get
their message across to the voters.
61
All of these approaches would have the collateral benefit of allowing
candidates to spend less time raising money and more time raising issues.
And these strategies have one other thing in common: they expand political
opportunity without limiting political speech. They say that if there is to be any
leveling principle in the First Amendment, it should be one of level up, not level
down. More speech, not silence coerced by law. Time has shown the wisdom of
that approach and the folly of an approach based on limits. That should not be
surprising because the enduring wisdom of the "more speech" solution is nothing
less than the enduring wisdom and very essence of the First Amendment itself:
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
60Jonathan Rauch, How to Repair America's Campaign Finance System, Part I.- Give Polls
Free Money, No Rules, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5, 1998, p.54-
56. Concluding that our current system of campaign finance is a disaster, one journalist,
Jonathan Rauch, proposed in U.S. News and World Report that Congressional candidates
be given a real choice between total and extremely generous public funding - perhaps
$500,000 for Congressional candidates, with tough restrictions on private contributions, or
forgoing public funding with no restrictions on contributions or expenditures. Implausible?
Naive? Crazy? Any more than our current campaign finance system?61For a strong argument against the constitutionality of requiring broadcasters to provide free
time for politicians, see LILLIAN BEVIER, Is FREE TV FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES
CONSTITUTIONAL? (1999); see also, Joel Gora, Five Fatal Flaws with Proposals for Free
TV, Talk presented at American Enterprise Institute, February 1999.
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